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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
\~ERDA LYNN d/b/a LYNN 
RgALTY, and UKITED FARM 
AGI~~NCY, INC., a Utah eorporation, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
YS. 
K. C. RANCHES, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Defe11da11t and Apprdlant. 
Case No. 
10611 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMEKT OF FACTS 
The facts set forth by appellant in its brief are sub-
stantially correct as to the factual matter contained 
therein, but conclusions of counsel not support by the 
evidence or facts should be disregarded by the Court. 
\Vith regards to Exhibit P-2, the Earnest l\Ioney 
Receipt and Offer to Purchase, it is significant to note 
that following the signing of the Earnest Money Receipt 
1 
and Off er to Purchase by the purchasers jn three dif-
ferent places, the defendant corporation, by and through 
its secretary, signed tlw agrePrnent in the place indicated 
by appellant in its statement of facts, but in addition 
also signed the agreemt>nt on Jim' ±G of Raid agreement 
acknowledging receipt of the final copy of the foregoing 
agreement bearing all signatures. Likewise this was dat-
ed by the defendant. ( R-40) 
It is significant to note certain additional facts: 
(1) That K. C. Ranches, Inc., transferred the prop-
erty to Doxey-Layton 1Company for no consideration 
whatsoever after the conunencement of this action. (R-
18, 19, 51, 52, 53 and 106) 
(2) That Mary K. Bennett was the only officer and 
director of K. C. Ranches, Inc., within the State of Utah 
having a legal capacity to contract. (R-37) (R-75) 
(3) That at the time of the execution of the listing 
agreement, plaintiff's Exhibit P-1, her husband, an offi-
cer and one of the three directors of the company, was 
incarcerated in the State Hospital at Provo, Utah, (R-36), 
and awaiting trial for murder. (R-72) 
( 4) That the corporation did not requdiate the ex-
ecution of the listing agreement or Earnest l\Ioney Re-
ceipt and Off er to Purchase by the letter of May 28, 
1965, introduced by defendant as Exhihit D 5. 
( 5) That Mary K. Bennett consistently refused to 
testify under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution 
of the rnited States as to her personal dealings with 
2 
K. C. Ranches or with Doxey-Layton Realty and to 
whether or not she had emhezzeled money from Doxey-
Layton which ·was put into K. C. Ranches, and that being 
the reason for the transfer by K. C. Ranches back to 
Doxey-Layton of the propert)· in question. (R-53, 105 
and 106) 
( 6) That at the directors meeting allegedly held 
about May 28, 1965, the ::;aid Mary K. Bennett was the 
only director present at that meeting, and it was at this 
time that the offer was withdrawn. (R-7-!) 
(7) That both the agent of United Farm Agency, 
Inc., one of the plaintiffs herein, and Y erda Lynn, 
testified that they had agreed to accept the commission 
payment specified by Mrs. Bennett and K. C. Ranches, 
Inc. on Exhibit P-2 on the day or da~· after the execution 
of said earnest mone.v receipt and offer to purchase 
(R-90, 91, 89 and 99). 
( 8) That the evidence of plaintiff showed that the 
defendant did not advise anyone of its decision to refuse 
to go through with the purchase until some time after 




THERE IS SUFFICIENT COMPETENT EVIDENCE 
IN THE RECORD TO SUPPORT THE COURT'S 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
JUDGMENT. 
The court specifically found in its memorandum 
decision and its findings of fact and conclusions of law 
that the said Mary K. Bennett, the secretary and di rector 
of the defendant corporation, executed the listing agree-
ment, plaintiff's exhibit No. P-1, and the Earnest Money 
Receipt and Offer to Purchase, plaintiff's Exhibit P-2. 
The court further found that she had authority to bind 
the corporation and that plaintiff's accepted and agreed 
to take the one-half interest in the land being taken as 
down payment as their commission. (Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law R-!17, 18 and 19) 
It is submitted that the citation of authority for 
the proposition that the Supreme Court will not alter 
the decision of the Trial Court where tlwre is substantial 
evidence to sustain the decision of said court would un-
dulyprolong this brief as the court has so held on many 
occasions. 
POINT II 
l\IARY K. BENNETT, AS SECRETARY AND DI-
RECTOR OF THE DEFENDANT, BOUND SAID 
CORPORATION BY HER ACTIONS. 
The record is replete with the undisputed facts that 
Mary K. Bennett was the sole officer and director with-
4 
in the State of Utah of the defendant corporation. Like-
wise she had ownership of virtually all of the stock of the 
corporation, save and exct~pt qualifying shares of her 
husband and a l\lr. Black, \Vho resided in Colorado. 'l1he 
corporation was merely a shell for the operations of 
.Mrs. Bennett. Accordi~g to her own testimony when the 
letter of l\lay 28, 1965, Exhibit D-5, was drafted and sent 
to the plaintiff, linited Farm Agency, the board of di-
rectors meetings of which she mentions in said letter 
consisted of merely hen;elf meeting with herself to· de-
cide what she would do. (R-7--1:) It is interesting to note 
that the letter of l\lay 28, 1965, did not repudiated the 
actions of l\lrs. Bennett in making the listing agree-
ment, and impliedly thereby did not repudiate the execu-
tion of tlw Earnest l\lone~· Receipt and Offer to Pur-
chase, and the defense of lack of corporate capacity was 
not raised by affirmative pleading in its answer as re-
quired by Rule 8 ( c) U.R. C.P. 
As the corporation was actually being conducted in 
essence as a sole proprietorship by the said l\lary K. 
Bennett, it would have been a fruitless and meaningless 
act to go through the motions of convening a meeting of 
the board of directors for l\lrs. Bennet to conduct a meet-
ing to be attended only by herself for the purposes of 
passing a corporate resolution authorizing her to enter 
into this Earnest l\loney Reciept and Offer to Purchase. 
Appellant quotes the Utah Business Corpo·ration 
Act, 16-10-74, as authority for the re<1nirement of a board 
meeting and written or printed notice to each- of the 
stockholders of the contemplated sale. It is submitted 
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that the purpose of this particular section of the Act 
is for the pro.tection of the stockholdern and not of per-
sons dealing with the corporation. This is evidenced by 
16-10-75 and 16-10-76. Appellant refers to the Articles of 
Incorporation of said corporation. rrhese were not put 
into evidence by defendant and properly may not now 
be referred to. However, as Mary K. Bennett owned 
ostensibly 98% of the outstanding shares, such a ratifi-
cation may be inferred from the fact that she entered 
into the contract herself. 
Be it as it may, the very conduct which appellanf 
now claims to have been in violation of Utah Code, it 
followed when it transferred its property to Doxey-
-Layton for no consideration whatsoever. It is submitted 
that the reason for the transfer to Doxey-Layton is be-
cause the said Mary K. Bennett, in her personal dealings, 
transferred the corporate property to Doxey-Layton as 
a means of solving her own difficulties. 
As there was ample evidence to sustain the court's 
findings, the findings will not be upset except for mani-
fest error. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO THEIR REAL 
ESTATE COMMISSION BY REASON OF HAVING 
PROCURED A BON A FIDE SALE OF THE PROP-
ERTY LISTED BY DEFENDANT CORPORATION. 
The evidence is clear that the plaintiffs found a 
buyer ready, willing and able to purchase the land of 
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defendant, and that further the plaintiffs had agreed to 
accept their commission in the tran~fer to them of an 
inh'rl'st in land. 
The J£arnest Money Reciept and Offer to Purchase, 
Exhibit P-2, between purchaser and seller, was complete 
and nothing was left to be done as between them, and 
constituted a binding contract. Bunnell ·i;. Bills, 368 P.2d 
597, 13 U.2d 83. The document \Vas filleu out and signed 
by all parties, and receipt of the final offer was ack-
nowledged by the corporate officer and director, Mary 
K. Bennett. 
The arrangement between the plaintiffs and seller 
was an agreement separate and apart from that between 
the purchaser and seller, as the purchasers had no inter-
est and could have no interest in the payment of the com-
mission from the seller to the plaintiffa. 
Seller made an offer to the plaintiffs to pay their 
commission by the acceptance by them of an interest in 
certain land. This off er was accepted by both of the 
plaintiffs. Thornton v. Pasch, 139 P.2d 1002, 104 U. 313. 
All of the terms and conditions would have been further 
reduced to writing (R-92) thereby placing the terms 
and conditions at this point partially oral and partially 
in writing in one written document. Radley, et al, v. 
Smith, et al, 313 P.2d 465, 6 U.2d 304. The mere fact 
that the acceptance of the commission terms was oral 
is inconsequential. R. J. Daum Construction Co. v. Child, 
247 P.2d 817, 112 U. 194. 
At no time until the commencement of this action 
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did the defendant raise as an issue the acceptance of 
the commission in land. This was not the reason for the 
withdrawal of the off er to sell the land; and the letter 
of May 28, 1965, Exhibit D-5, clearly shows that the rea-
son for the withdrawl of the land from the market was 
not the commission basis, but that corporate affairs 
would be better served by holding the property. It is 
interesting to note that shortly thereafter the property 
was conveyed over to DoxPy-Layton. Just how this 
better served the corporation is not clear. 
It is submited that everything \Vas done that needed 
to be done, that Mary K. Bennett had spo·ken with Mr . 
.Massey, the agent of the plaintiff United Farm Agency, 
Inc. by phone and confirmed the commission arrange-
ment (R-98), and had been further advised by Mrs. Lynn 
that the terms of the conunission payment were satisfac-
tory not only to her but as to United Farm Agency 
whom she was representing as their agent. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of 
the lower court should be sustained. 
There is ample and substantial evidence in the record 
to sustain the holding of the trial court, and it is re-
spectfully submitted that plaintiffs are entitled to their 
commission and the commission is due and payable by 
the defendant. 
A bona fide contract was entered into, which was 
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binding on all parties. The defendant'.;; breach of this 
contract has resulted in damages to the plaintiffs, for 
which they are entitled to their judgment. 
The judgment of the lower court should be affirmed 
and the respondents herein awarded their costs. 
Respectfully submited, 
Paul N. Cotro-Manes of 
COTRO-MANES & 
COTRO-MANES 
430 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Ftah 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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